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ABSTRACT 
 
 
AN EMPIRICAL STUDY ON THE EFFECT OF THE INVESTMENT 
PURPOSE CHANGE UNDER THE NEW 5 % RULE OF KOREA 
 
By 
 
Kap-Sok Kwon 
 
 
This paper examines the relationship between the investment purpose of toehold 
investor and the target firm’s value using a hand-collected sample of 101 changes in 
investment purpose from Korea during 2005. I find evidence that a toehold investor 
creates value by changes in the declared intention of investment from passive to 
active participation. Specifically, the announcement is followed by statistically 
significant abnormal returns of 1.97% and 2.82% during the 3 day window and 11 day 
window surrounding the announcement date respectively. The highest abnormal 
returns occur when toehold investors are foreign and declared investment purpose is 
comprehensive. The results suggest that even simple change in investment purpose, 
not accompanied by additional share acquisition, can affect firm value by influencing 
the likelihood and magnitude of value enhancing events. 
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Section I. Introduction 
 
Corporate governance is related with the resolution of collective action issues 
among investors and the reconciliation of conflicts of interest between various 
corporate stakeholders. Although there has been voluminous research on corporate 
governance issues, it is also true that there are still many areas to be explored further. 
One of those areas is the shareholder activism. It is still unclear how various types of 
the shareholder activism influence the firm value.  
This paper examines the relationship between the investment purpose of minority 
investor or toehold investor1 and the target firm’s value. Differently from prior 
research which focused on share acquisition of toehold investors, this paper shows 
how they influence the target firm’s value only by declaring the intention of active 
management participation. Since the declaration, on average, is not accompanied by 
significant changes in equity holdings, the empirical tests are relatively free from the 
                                            
1 This paper uses the term “minority investor” and “toehold investor” interchangeably. 
These terms here mean any person who holds 5 percent or more of the equity 
securities of a target company togeth r with the specially relatd rson. Based on 
the 5 percent rule of Korea, equity securities mean not only common tocks but also
any securities with equity conversion fea ures or options such as convertible bonds, 
bonds with warrants, exchangeable bonds, and stock warrants that gra t voting rights 
in the target company. 
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possibility that the purchase or sales of the equity securities may influence the share 
price. 
The change of regulation environment in Korea makes it possible to examine the 
market reaction toward investor’s declaration of the changes in investment purpose. 
The newly amended 5 percent rule of Korea took effect on March 29, 2005. One of 
the important changes in the newly amended 5 percent rule is that a change in 
investment purpose triggers mandatory filing of the change. In order to examine the 
market reaction, this paper focuses on the change of the investment purpose which is 
from ‘investment only’ to ‘exercising influence on the management’. Using filings 
from Korean electronic disclosure system from March 29, 2005 through December 
2005, I identify 101 events available for the empirical study. These events are just the 
disclosures of the intention that investor may exercise influence on potential 
management issues, not necessarily related to specific actions such as proxy fights, 
acquisitions, and so on. Moreover, since investors are required to file even without 
any changes in equity holdings, we can observe relatively clearly how the declaration 
of shareholder’s activism has influenced the shareholder value in the market. 
I find evidence that changes in the investment purpose to the direction of more 
active participation creates value. The announcement of investment purpose change 
generates statistically significant cumulative abnormal returns. Specifically the 
- 3 - 
average abnormal returns are 1.97% and 2.82% during the 3 day window and 11 day 
window around the announcement date respectively.  
   I then divide my sample into several sub-samples based on the nationality of the 
investor –foreign or domestic - and the degree of the investor’s intentions to exercise 
influence – comprehensive if an investor selects more than 7 management items in 
the section of investment purpose, or limited if less than 3. I find that foreign or 
comprehensive investors generate larger and more significant abnormal returns. The 
abnormal returns are the largest when the investors are both foreign and 
comprehensive at the same time. 
   These findings suggest that firm value can be influenced by the investor’s 
declaration of potential active participation on the management without the 
additional acquisition of equity securities. Moreover, the degree of market reaction is 
influenced by how much actively and broadly a toehold investor is expected to 
exercise influence on the management. 
    This paper is organized as follows. Section II reviews the literature on toehold 
investors and shareholder activism and builds this paper’s hypothesis. Section III 
explains the details of newly amended 5 percent rule in Korea. Section IV describes 
the data set. In section V, I examine the returns surrounding the announcement and 
the cross-sectional relationship between the returns and ownership characteristics. 
- 4 - 
Section VI summarizes and concludes the paper. 
 
 
Section II. Literature Review and Hypothesis Building 
 
The effect of investor’s disclosure about its investment purpose change on target 
firm’s value is related with 1) the effect of holding more than 5 percent or more of 
equity securities, 2) the effect of investor’s active participation on the management of 
the target company, 3) the relationship between better governance and better firm 
value or performance.  
Mikkelson and Ruback’s (1985) show that on the market response to the news of 
an accumulated position of 5 percent or more of the equity is significantly positive. 
They assert that the possible outcomes of the toehold investment positions include a 
completed takeover, a completed takeover by another firm, a repurchase of the 
investment position by the target firm, and a sale of shares in the market or to a third 
party. They find that shareholders of target firms, which experienced one or more of 
these investment outcomes, earn positive abnormal returns.2 Meanwhile, the average 
cumulative prediction errors are negative for investments without outcomes from the 
                                            
2 See Mikkelson and Ruback (1985), Table 7. 
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day before the initial announcement through the last trading day of the third calendar 
year following the initial announcement.3 This implies that market participants might 
perceive a toehold acquisition as an increased probability of subsequent takeover bids.    
The study of Mikkelson and Ruback can be applied to the investment outcomes of 
toehold acquisitions, but not to the outcomes that involve transfer of control. Choi 
(1991) expands the analysis of Mikkelson and Ruback’s study by testing the 
proposition that toehold acquisitions facilitate value-enhancing control transfers. He 
shows that control transfers4 are more likely among firms that are subject to toehold 
acquisitions than among firms that are not. He also shows that toehold acquisitions 
followed by takeovers, proxy fights, and management turnovers exhibit abnormal 
increases in share value and the absence of control transfer events lowers share price.5 
This explains the relationship between the initial toehold acquisition and the outcomes 
related to the transfer of control, but it does not show how firm value can be 
influenced by the change of investor’s intention or its characteristics around the 
announcement date. 
The paper of Malatesta and Thompson (1985) presents a model of stock price 
                                            
3 See Mikkelson and Ruback (1985), Figure 1. 
4 The control transfer events include: (1)those affected by “takeov rs” o“ownership
changes” such as mergers, tender offers, leveraged buyouts, management buyouts, 
and liquidation; (2) those caused by “managem nt changes” that include top 
management turnover (i.e., all changes in the top three management po itions, CEO, 
president, and chairman of the board), proxy fights, and consent solicitations. 
5 See Choi (1991), Figure 2. 
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reactions to partially anticipated events. As a partial acquisition may generate market 
expectations of subsequent events such as a takeover bid, a part of the economic 
impact of the event is capitalized at the time of the partial acquisition. Based on this 
argument, we can expect that the investor’s investment purpose change will be 
reflected in the firm value because it will influence the market expectation of the 
benefits from toehold investor’s activism. We can also expect that the impact of the 
disclosure may be different because the different characteristics of investor’s intention 
will vary the likelihood and magnitude of subsequent corporate control event and its 
benefit. 
Then, a minority investor, which has the intention of the investment in the 
direction of more active participation, will improve the governance of the target firm 
and hence firm value can be increased?   
In theory, shareholder activism should make the corporate management more 
responsive to value-maximizing policies. By increasing management efficiency 
through external or internal mechanism of corporate governance, shareholder value 
may increase. However, previous papers, summarized by Black (1998), Karpoff 
(2001) and Romano (2001), find that institutional investors in the United States spend 
a trivial amount of money on overt activism efforts, and that when they do, their 
actions have little impact on the firms they target. Nor is there consistent evidence 
- 7 - 
that investors earn significantly positive returns surrounding the disclosure of 
governance improvement actions, or that institutional shareholder activism produces 
long-term tangible benefits to investors (Black, 1998; Karpoff, 2001).  
Studies on hedge funds provide a somewhat different picture. Klein and Zur 
(2006) argue that hedge funds differ substantially from mutual funds and pension 
funds in ways that make it beneficial for them to become activists. They define hedge 
fund activism as when a hedge fund files a 13D filing after taking an initial stake of 5 
percent or more in the company, and clearly states in the filing’s “purpose” section 
that it intends to proactively influence management’s future decisions. Through the 
analysis of a sample between January 1, 2003 and December 31, 2005, they find that 
the hedge fund activist gets the firm to acquiesce to its demands on the corporate 
governance issues in 60 percent of the cases and the market reacts favorably to the 
filing of the 13D. Over a 61 day period, surrounding and including the filing date, 
firms targeted by hedge funds activists have an abnormal return of 10.3%.   
The next issue is the relationship between better firm performance and better 
governance. In the United States, efforts to find a correlation between a firm’s 
governance attributes and its value mostly show weak or no results. Black (2001) 
interprets that this weak correlation between the corporate governance practices of 
U.S. firms and firm value or performance could reflect the restricted domain of data, 
- 8 - 
meaning that the minimum quality of corporate governance, set by securities law, 
corporate law, stock exchange rules, and behavioral norms so widely accepted that 
almost no public firms depart from them, is quite high. Unlikely from U.S. sample, he 
finds from Russian sample that governance improvement has strong relationship with 
the improvement of firm value. A worst to best governance improvement predicts a 
700-fold increase in firm value. 6  This result shows that corporate governance 
behavior has a powerful effect on market value in a country where legal and cultural 
constraints on corporate behaviors are weak. 
As far as Korean firms are concerned, Black, Jang and Kim (2005) construct a 
corporate governance index (KCGI, 0~100) for 515 Korean companies based on a 
2001 KSE survey. They find that a worst-to best change in KCGI predicts a 
statistically significant 0.47 increase in Tobin’s q, which is about 160% increase in 
share price, in OLS offering evidence consistent with a causal relationship between an 
overall governance index and higher share prices in emerging markets. They also find 
that Korean firms with 50% outside directors have 0.13 higher Tobin’s q (roughly 
40% higher share price).  
 
 
 
                                            
6 See Black (2001), Table 4 and Figure 1. 
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Section III. Overview of Korea’s 5 % Rule 
 
III-1. Background of Korea’s 5 % rule 
 
5 percent rule states that a person who holds 5 percent or more of the equity 
securities of a publicly held company (“target company”) or who thereafter changes 
its holdings by 1 percent or more in the target company must file a report with the 
Financial Supervisory Commission (FSC) and the Korea Exchange (KRX) within 5 
days7 from the date of the transaction or the change. The same rule is applicable to a 
person who changes the purpose of the investment in the target company.  
Originally, this 5 percent rule was adopted on December 31, 1991. The goal was 
to provide a fair level of protection for the management of publicly held companies 
and for investors. In January 5, 1994, the scope of the reporting person was broadened 
to include related persons so that shares owned by related persons in a target company 
must be disclosed together with those of the reporting person. In January 13, 1997, the 
concept of related parties was introduced, which encompass related persons and the 
                                            
7 In U.S. the reporting deadline of original report is 10 days. 
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persons8 that concurrently hold interests with the reporting person. For legal entities, 
the provisions on related persons were broadened to include any entity (including its 
directors and officers) that holds 30 percent or more in the reporting person (or vice 
versa) or any entity (including its directors and officers) that effectively exercises 
controlling influence on the reporting person (or vice versa). The range of securities 
subject to mandatory reporting was also extended to securities with equity conversion 
features or options. In January 17, 2005, the 5 percent rule was amended to require the 
reporting person to state the investment purpose whether it was to exercise control 
over the management or to attain investment gains only. The current 5 percent rule 
was passed by the National Assembly on December 31, 2004 and took effect on 
March 29, 2005.     
 
III-2. Contents of Newly Amended 5 % rule 
 
According to the press release of FSC, the amendment of March, 29, 2005 can be 
summarized by four distinctive features compared to the previous version.  
 
                                            
8 The term “concurrent holder” denot s any person that agrees to (1) acquire or 
dispose of shares and/or other interests in the subject company jointly with the
reporting person, (2) receive or transfer shares or other interests from or to the 
reporting person after the acquisition, or (3) jointly exercise voting rights arising 
from shares or other interest in the subject company. 
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1) Re-filing of disclosures for investors subject to the 5 percent rule.  
2) Five-day “cooling-off period” after reporting exercising influence on the 
management as the intended investment purpose.  
3) Reporting of a change in investment purpose.  
4) More specific disclosures on the reporting entity and the source of investment 
capital. 
 
Under the amended provisions, if an investor has an intention of exercising 
influence on the management as of the effective date, re-filing of disclosure should be 
done within 5 days after the new reporting requirements take effect on March 29, 
2005. Therefore, investors who, as of the effective date, changed the investment 
purpose to exercising influence on the management after a previous filing should file 
a new disclosure even if no change in share ownership had occurred since. 
The amended 5 percent rule also mandates a five-day cooling-off period. Investors 
are barred from acquiring any additional interests in the target company or exercising 
any voting rights in the affairs of the target company. If market participants observe 
an investor, who re-files a disclosure during mandatory re-filing period (March 29 to 
April 2) and changes its intention from investment only to exercising influence on the 
management, they possibly perceive that the investor may have a plan of some actions.  
- 12 - 
Differently from the previous version, more specific disclosures on the reporting 
entity and the source of investment capital should be reported. If the reporting entity 
is a business entity, disclosures are to be made on the legal form of the business entity, 
its officer, and its largest shareholder. If the purpose of the investment is exercising 
influence on the management, disclosures are to be made on the investment purpose 
and how the investment capital was formed. But these are not required if the 
investment purpose is investment only. 
The most interesting part of the newly amended 5 percent rule is reporting a 
change in investment purpose. Under the old rule, reporting of a change in investment 
purpose was required as supplementary information when a change in share 
ownership occurs. That is, no reporting was required for a change in investment 
purpose if no change in share ownership occurred. Under the newly amended 5 
percent rule, investors are required to not only disclose the specific purpose of the 
investment in the target but also report a change of investment purpose within 5 days 
from the date of the change even if no change in share ownership had occurred.   
There is one more important change related to reporting of a change in investment 
purpose. Korean regulation authorities define that exercising influence9  on the 
                                            
9 This includes exercising the right of minority shareholders to call for shareholders’ 
meeting, submit shareholder proposals, and give a third party the right to vote their 
shares as provider for under the Commercial Code of the Securities and Exchange 
Act. 
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management of the subject company means effectively exerting influence on the 
company or on its directors and offices to achieve any of the 10 management items. 
These 10 management items are as follows. 
 
1) Appointment, dismissal, or suspension of directors or the auditor of the 
company, 
2) Changes in the articles of incorporation concerning the board of directors or 
other organizational structures of the company, 
3) Changes in the company’s capital,  
4) Dividend distribution,  
5) Merger or spin-off,  
6) Stock exchange10 and stock transfer11,  
7) Whole or partial transfer of a corporate business to or from another company, 
8) Whole or a significant disposition of company assets,  
9) Whole or significant renting of the company business to a third party, contracts 
for third-party management of the company, profit-loss sharing agreement 
with a third party, and other similar contracts and changes in or termination of 
                                            
10 This term is used to describe hare transfers between two companies in hi h one 
becomes a wholly owned subsidiary of the other. 
11 This term is used to describe share transfers in which a company b comes a 
subsidiary of a newly incorporated parent. 
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such contracts, and  
10) Dissolution of the company as a going concern.  
 
An investor who has the intention of exercising influence on the management 
should choose from none12 to all items among these 10 items. Therefore, we can 
identify the characteristics of an investor by analyzing the choice of the investor. 
 
 
Section IV. Sample and Data Description 
 
IV-1. Sample Selection and Data Collection 
 
   In order to examine the market reaction toward investor’s declaration of the 
                                            
12 In our sample, there is only one investor (Hermes Pensions Management Ltd.) 
which chose none of 10 items, even though it d clared to have th intention of 
exercising influence on the management. Their description of invest  purpose 
provides an idea of what these investors’ in entions ar , which we provide below. 
“Basically, we purchased the shares of A Company in order to invest the fund of our 
client in a way of increasing the value of equity assets and achieving economic value. 
When we invent in a firm, we sometimes meet a representative of the firm to invest 
and discuss. In that case, we propose various things to order to improve long-term 
value of the firm. We have not done this kind of discussion with a repre entative of A 
Company. As of today, we do not h ve any plan to have this kind f discussion in the 
future. However, there is possibility that we can have a talk with  representative of 
A Company for understanding the pro pect of firm. As we always do in our equity 
investment all over the world, we are going to reserve our rights to nc urage th  
firm to improve management when we judge it is appropriate in ord r to increa e the 
long-term value of assets owned by our client.”  
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investment purpose change, this paper focuses on the change of the investment 
purpose which is from ‘investment only’ to ‘exercising influence on the management’. 
‘Investment only’ means the current goal of an investor is restricted to capital gains 
only. In contrary, ‘exercising influence on the management’ means that an investor 
intends to effectively exert influence on a company or on its officers to achieve some 
goals such as appointment, dismissal, or suspension of the duties of directors or the 
auditor of the company.  
   I obtain my sample of events from the news database of various Korean internet 
portals and DART (Data Analysis, Retrieval and Transfer System)13, which is an 
electronic disclosure system in Korea that allows companies to submit disclosures 
online, where it becomes immediately available to investors and other users. The daily 
returns for the target companies are obtained from the database maintained by Korea 
Securities Research Institute (KSRI). I manually searched these information sources 
for data from March 29, 2005 and December 31, 2005. 
The criteria that I use for sample selection are as follows.  
 
1) An investor changes investment purpose from ‘investment only’ to ‘exercising 
influence on the management’, 
                                            
13 http://dart.fss.or.kr 
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2) Prior disclosures of the investor should be found from DART so that I can 
identify its prior investment information, 
3) Only the initial disclosure of investment purpose change, not updates or  
revisions,  
4) Daily return data for the event window should be available from the KSRI  
database,  
5) An investor or its related parties are neither the management nor a member of 
the board,  
7) Only one should be selected if there are disclosures related to 5 percent rule 
from more than one investor at the same date. 
 
I use two steps for identifying an event. At first, I initially examine all reports of 
large equity ownership reported in DART system between March 29, 2005 and April 
2, 2005. During this period, an investor who has an intention for exercising influence 
on the management has to re-file a disclosure. In total, there are 1,940 filings under 
mandatory re-filing policy including 182 filings for revisions. By examining these 
1,758 filings manually based on the previous criteria, I identify 50 events. Then, I 
compile a list of detailed information from the event disclosures. For example, the 
name and nationality of the toehold investor, the name of the target company, the 
- 17 - 
equity holdings of the investor, the change in the equity holdings of the investor 
compared to prior disclosure, the equity holdings of the largest shareholder in the 
target company14, the number of management items the investor chooses in the 
section of investment purpose, and so on. 
For period between April 4, 2005 and December 31, 200515, I perform a 
comprehensive news search in various internet portals for identifying investment 
purpose changing events. Through this process, I identify additional 51 events. Then, 
I go back to DART and collect the detailed information described above. So, the final 
sample consists of 101 disclosures of declaring the investment purpose change. 
Table 1 shows the characteristics of the sample. 47 events are from Korea Stock 
Exchange (KSE) and 54 events are from Korea Securities Dealers Automated 
Quotation (KOSDAQ), which is similar to NASDAQ in United States. The number of 
investors is relatively small compared to the number of events. This is because a small 
number of investors invest in many companies. For example, ABN AMRO Bank N.V. 
(London Branch) and Templeton Asset Management, Ltd (including its related 
parties) changed the purpose of investment in 24 and 23 companies respectively. 
While 43% of sample shows no change in the equity holdings, 34% increases the 
                                            
14 Since this information is not included in the filing, I refer to other rece t filing 
which I can get the equity holdings of the largest shareholder of the targ t company. 
15 The total number of large equity ownership filings reported in DART during this 
period was 6456, which is well beyond the limit of manual verification, considering 
the limited amount of resources. 
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percent of ownership and 24% decreases. However, this change does not mean an 
investor purchases or sells its ownership at the point of the disclosure. This is just 
from the comparison between event disclosure and prior disclosure. As far as the 
ownership of the largest shareholder is concerned, mostly it is less than 50%.  
The events are classified into two types: ‘Comprehensive’ if an investor chooses 
more than 7 items of management issues in the section of investment purpose and 
‘limited’ if less than 3 items. Since no investors choose between 3 and 7 in my sample, 
this provides a very clear cutoff. In 63% of sample companies, investors declare that 
they are interested in more than 7 items among 10 management issues mentioned in 
Section III. ‘Limited’ type of investor typically chooses the combination of items 
among 1), 2), 3), and 4) mentioned in Section III.  
Table 2 presents the distribution of the equity holdings of the investors, the change 
in the equity holdings, and the ownership of the largest shareholder. The mean 
(median) of the equity holdings is 12.74% (11.48%), which seems large enough to 
influence the management. The mean (median) of change in the equity holdings is 
0.23% (0.00%) points implying that these investment purpose changes are not 
accompanied by major changes in shareholdings. 
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IV-2. Method of Measuring Abnormal Returns. 
 
   In order to measure how the market responds to the disclosure, I compute the 
abnormal share price reaction around the announcement date. The basic return data 
for the market index and selected sample companies are from the KSRI database. The 
market index return is calculated as follows:  
1
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I compute )(TARi , the T-day cumulative market-adjusted return for stock i since 
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Where, t = 0 is the announcement date, tiR ,  and tmktR ,  are the return for stock i 
and the market return on day t, respectively.  
I also compute )(TARi  for the event window surrounding the announcement 
date, as follows: 
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Where, 1t  and 2t  are the first and last days of the event window.  
I measure the event time not in calendar days, but in trading days. 
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Section V. Results 
 
V-1. CARs Associated with the Sample Characteristics 
 
Table 3 presents the cumulative abnormal returns for two event windows and the 
t-statistics associated with the average returns. Panel A is based on 3 day window (-1, 
1) and Panel B is based on 11 day window (-5, 5). The results indicate that the 
announcement of investment purpose change generates statistically significant 
cumulative abnormal returns. The cumulative abnormal returns are 1.97% (t = 2.52) 
and 2.82% (t = 2.45) for 3 day window and 11 day window around the announcement 
date respectively. This shows market participants believe that changes in the intention 
of the investment in direction of more active participation creates value.  
   The results seem to be clearer in the test of sub-samples. I divide the sample into 
several sub-samples based on the nationality of an investor – foreign or domestic - 
and the type of an investor’s willingness to exercise influence – comprehensive 
purpose if an investor selects more than 7 management items in the section of 
investment purpose, or limited if less than 3. In particular, a sub-sample, which is 
- 21 - 
categorized as ‘comprehensive’ group, can be regarded as a group of more active 
investors. In their filings, they declare they are willing to exert influence on almost 
all issues of the management. In those issues, not only management change issues 
such as appointment of directors or change of the articles about board of director, but 
also fundamental issues such as acquisitions or even dissolution of the company are 
all included.  
   The cumulative abnormal returns in a sub-sample, which is categorized as 
comprehensive purpose or foreign investment, are larger and more statistically 
significant. For example, abnormal returns are 3.31% (t = 2.83) for comprehensive 
investors and 3.18% (t = 2.92) for foreign investors over 3 day window. Over 11 day 
window, the corresponding abnormal returns are 4.83% (t = 2.91) and 3.22% (t = 
2.21) respectively. The abnormal returns get much larger if we restrict the sample to 
foreign investment and comprehensive purpose at the same time. For 3 day and 11 
day windows, the cumulative abnormal returns are 7.32% (t = 3.58) and 7.40% (t = 
2.71) respectively.  
   Since this is just the declaration of investor’s intention, not an actual governance 
action undertaken by the investor, this result supports the anticipated takeover bid 
hypothesis and the control transfer hypothesis. These two hypotheses explain the 
value increase as a result of investor’s perception of the increased likelihood of a 
- 22 - 
subsequent takeover or subsequent value-enhancement by management. 
   Table 4 and Figure 1 present the cumulative abnormal returns from Day -5 
through Day + 10 for the sample. A reporting person should report the information 
within 5 days if there is significant change in holding amount by 1 percent or more 
or if there is change in investment purpose. In the papers of Mikkelson and Ruback 
(1985) and Choi (1991), they show the leakage of information is reflected in the pre-
announcement abnormal returns. This evidence makes it possible to interpret that the 
market reacts to increased trading activity in the target firm’s shares prior to the 
disclosure. However, I am not able to find a drastic and statistically significant 
increase in abnormal return before the announcement date. Rather, as Table 4 and 
Figure 1 show, there is a relatively drastic and statistically significant increase in 
abnormal returns during three days after the announcement date. One possible reason 
is that it is unlikely to happen the leakage of information without trading activities. 
 
V-2. Regression Analysis 
 
   In order to examine whether the effect of foreign ownership and comprehensive 
investment purpose are independent from the changes in ownership, I regress the 
abnormal returns on the foreign ownership dummy and comprehensive investment 
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dummy, controlling for changes in ownership and other ownership characteristics. 
The following provides a detailed description of the regressions, as well as some 
priors on the sign of the coefficients. 
 
1) Foreign investment dummy (Type of the investor’s nationality): Market 
participants may perceive there is higher probability of value enhancing events 
from foreign investors. 
2) Investment purpose dummy (Type of the investor’s willingness to exercise 
influence):  Market participants may perceive that there is higher probability 
of value enhancing events in the comprehensive type of investor  
3) Changes in the equity holdings of an investor: If an investor increases the 
ownership in a target company since the prior disclosure, the abnormal return 
may get larger. Market participants may perceive that there is higher probability 
of value enhancing events in increased ownership. 
4) Equity holdings of an investor: If an investor’s holding is large, it may have 
more influence on the abnormal returns. For example, market participants may 
perceive that there is higher probability of value enhancing events when the 
block ownership by an outside investor is large (Shleifer & Vishny, 1986).  
5) Ownership of the largest Shareholder: Market participants may perceive there is 
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less probability of value-enhancing events when the ownership of the largest 
shareholder is bigger. 
6) Type of market dummy: Market participants may perceive there is higher 
probability of value-enhancing events in KOSDAQ rather than KSE. 
 
   Table 5 presents the correlations across the regressions. As can be seen, there 
seems to be no serious issue regarding multicollinearity. Investment purpose dummy 
has relatively stronger negative correlations with foreign investment dummy and 
market dummy than other variables. Possible reason may be that most of foreign 
investment cases in KSE declare they are interested in less than 3 items among the 10 
management issues. 
Table 6 reports the regression results for the 3 day (-1, +1) window and 11 day (-5, 
+5) window respectively. In contrast to my prior expectations, the estimated 
coefficients on ‘Equity Holdings’, ‘Change in Equity Holdings’, ‘Ownership of the 
Largest Shareholder’ and ‘Type of Market’ are all statistically insignificant. At least in 
my sample, these independent variables do not seem to explain the variations in 
abnormal returns. The dummy variable, ‘Investment Purpose’, which is directly 
related with the degree of willingness to actively participate in governance issues, 
explains the abnormal returns in both of two windows. The estimated coefficient on 
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‘Investment Purpose’ is positive and statistically significant as well. However, in case 
of ‘Foreign Investment’, the statistical significance of the estimated coefficient on the 
variable does not persist in 11 day window. This result may show the nationality of an 
investor itself alone can not be a factor of generating additional firm value in the 
longer term and ‘Investment Purpose’ is the only key factor of value creation among 
the variables that I come up with. 
 
 
Section VI. Summary and Conclusion 
 
   This paper examines the relationship between the investment purpose of toehold 
investor and the target firm’s value from the sample of 101 events between March 29, 
2005 and December 31, 2005. Under the newly amended 5 percent rule of Korea, 
which took effect on March 29, 2005, we can identify the relatively pure effect of the 
changes in investment purpose on the target firms’ value.  
   I find that the market reacts favorably to the filings which toehold investors 
declare to become active investors from passive investors. The announcement of 
investment purpose change generates statistically significant cumulative abnormal 
returns. The average abnormal returns are 1.97% and 2.82% for 3 day window and 11 
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day window around the announcement date respectively. Furthermore, the highest 
abnormal returns occur when toehold investors are foreign and their investment 
purpose is comprehensive at the same time. 
Finally, the abnormal returns generated by the filings of investment purpose 
change are not associated with the size of the equity holdings of toehold investors, its 
change, and the size of the largest shareholder’s ownership, but associated with the 
magnitude of investment purpose and the nationality of investor.  
The results suggest that even simple changes in investment purpose, not 
accompanied by additional share acquisition, can affect firm value by influencing the 
likelihood and magnitude of the value enhancing events. 
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Table 1. Characteristics of the Sample 
 
This table reports the characteristic of the sample. The sample period is from March 
29 to December 31 2005. The target firms of the sample are all the publicly traded 
firms of which the investors holding more than 5% declared a change in investment 
purpose from portfolio investment only to active participation during the same period. 
In calculating the number of investors, an investor who invested in more than one 
firm is counted as one investor. The change of ownership is estimated through the 
comparison between the disclosure of investment purpose change and prior disclosure. 
The events are divided into two types: Comprehensive if an investor chooses more 
than 7 items of management issues in the section of investment purpose and limited if 
less than 3. 
 
 KSE KOSDAQ Total 
Number of Events 47 54 101 
Number of Investors 18 16 27 
Foreign Investment 31 32 63 
Increase 20 14 34 
No Change 19 24 43 Equity Holdings 
Decrease 8 16 24 
> 50% 6 3 9 
1/3 <  < 50% 10 24 34 
Ownership of Largest 
Shareholder 
< 1/3 31 27 58 
Comprehensive 
(more than 7) 19 45 64 Investment 
Purpose Limited 
(less than 3) 28 9 37 
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Table 2. Distribution of Equity Holdings 
 
This table reports the distribution of equity holdings in the target firms in the sample. 
‘Equity holdings’ is the ownership of the reporting investor in the each sample. The 
equity holdings is calculated by dividing the sum of equity securities, held by the 
reporting investor together with related parties, by the sum of total number of issued 
stocks and the number of stocks to be held from exercising stock options or bonds 
with equity conversion features. ‘∆ Equity holdings’ is the change of ownership of the 
reporting investor since the prior disclosure. ‘Largest Shareholder’ shows the equity 
holdings of the largest shareholder and its related parties.  
 
  Mean Std Dev Median Min Max 
Equity Holdings 12.74% 0.0686 11.48% 4.61% 38.68 
∆ Equity 
Holdings 
0.23% 0.0283 0.00% -5.19% 26.48% 
Largest 
Shareholder 
32.04% 0.1378 32.43% 3.74% 69.02% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
- 29 - 
Table 3. CARs Associated with the Sample Characteristics 
 
This table reports the cumulative abnormal return for two event windows and the t-
statistics associated with the average returns. Panel A covers 3 day window (-1, 1) and 
Panel B covers 11 day window (-5, 5). Two Panels also present the average abnormal 
return and the t-statistics for the sub-samples based on the following two factors; the 
nationality of the investor and the type of the investor’s willingness to exercise 
influence on the management. 
 
Panel A (-1, 1): 
  Type of the investor’s willingness to exercise influence 
  All Comprehensive Limited 
All 
N=101 
1.97% 
(2.518) 
N=64 
3.31% 
(2.834) 
N=37 
-0.36% 
(-0.705) 
Foreign 
N=63 
3.18% 
(2.918) 
N=29 
7.32% 
(3.584) 
N=34 
-0.35% 
(-0.629) 
Nationality 
Of the investor 
Domestic 
N=38 
-0.05% 
(-0.054) 
N=35 
-0.01% 
(-0.014) 
N=3 
-0.49% 
(-0.632) 
 
Panel B (-5, 5): 
  Type of the investor’s willingness to exercise influence 
  All Comprehensive Limited 
All 
N=101 
2.82% 
(2.449) 
N=64 
4.83% 
(2.911) 
N=37 
-0.66% 
(-0.602) 
Foreign 
N=63 
3.22% 
(2.207) 
N=29 
7.40% 
(2.713) 
N=34 
-0.34% 
(-0.313) 
Nationality 
Of the investor 
Domestic 
N=38 
2.16% 
(1.139) 
N=35 
2.70% 
(1.358) 
N=3 
-4.22% 
(-0.732) 
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Table 4. CARs from Day -5 through Day +10 
 
This table reports the cumulative abnormal returns from Day -5 through Day +10 and 
the t-statistics associated with average values. 
 
N=101 CAR t-stat 
D-5 0.73% 1.681 
D-4 1.51% 2.737 
D-3 0.97% 1.666 
D-2 0.81% 1.295 
D-1 0.66% 0.955 
D 1.16% 1.514 
D+1 2.76% 2.919 
D+2 2.47% 2.664 
D+3 3.29% 2.742 
D+4 2.85% 2.653 
D+5 2.82% 2.449 
D+6 2.67% 2.286 
D+7 2.76% 2.083 
D+8 3.24% 2.166 
D+9 3.05% 2.028 
D+10 2.62% 1.697 
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Table 5. Correlation Matrix for Explanatory Variables 
 
This table reports the correlation between explanatory variables. ‘Equity Holdings’ is the percentage of share-holding by the investor who 
changed its purpose of investment from ‘investment only’ to ‘exercising influence on the management’. ‘∆ Equity Holdings’ is the change of 
investor’s ownership between event disclosure and prior disclosure about its equity holdings. ‘Investment Purpose’ is dummy variable equal to 1 
if the number of items that the investor wants to exert its influence exceeded 7 and zero if less than 3. ‘Foreign Investment’ is a dummy variable 
equal to 1 if the investor is classified as a foreign investor and zero otherwise. ‘Largest Shareholder’ is the percentage of equity holdings by the 
largest shareholder and its related parties. ‘Type of Market’ is dummy variable equal to 1 if the targeted firm is traded in KSE and zero if traded 
in KOSDAQ. Statistically significant correlations (at 5% level or better) are shown in boldface. 
 
 Equity Holdings ∆ Equity Holdings 
Investment 
Purpose 
Foreign 
Investment 
Largest 
Shareholder Type of Market 
Equity Holdings 1      
∆ Equity Holdings 0.461 1     
Investment Purpose 0.384 0.025 1    
Foreign Investment -0.283 -0.148 -0.463 1   
Largest Shareholder 0.051 -0.094 0.111 -0.186 1  
Type of Market -0.149 -0.017 -0.444 0.069 -0.175 1 
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Table 6. Regression Analysis 
 
This table reports coefficient estimates and their t-values of cross-sectional regressions of the returns on various characteristics. The dependent 
variable is the 3 day window CARs in Panel A and the 11 day window CARs in Panel B.  
 
Panel A (-1, 1): 
Explanatory Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Intercept -0.058 (-2.984) 
0.020 
(2.495) 
0.012 
(0.699) 
0.049 
(2.478) 
0.029 
(2.730) 
-0.032 
(-0.903) 
Foreign Investment 0.060 (3.539)     
0.057 
(3.182) 
Investment Purpose 0.064 (3.804)     
0.066 
(3.232) 
∆ Equity Holdings  0.007 (0.024)    
0.104 
(0.344) 
Equity Holdings   0.063 (0.552)   
-0.014 
(-0.105) 
Largest Shareholder    -0.091 (-1.609)  
-0.077 
(-1.380) 
Type of  Market     -0.020 (-1.294) 
-0.001 
(-0.039) 
Adjusted 2R  0.14 -0.010 -0.007 0.016 0.007 0.126 
N 101 
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Panel B (-5, 5): 
Explanatory Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Intercept -0.052 (-1.714) 
0.029 
(2.488) 
0.008 
(0.333) 
0.033 
(1.136) 
0.047 
(3.042) 
-0.035 
(-0.640) 
Foreign Investment 0.049 (1.889)     
0.043 
(1.565) 
Investment Purpose 0.078 (2.982)     
0.062 
(1.944) 
∆ Equity Holdings  -0.268 (-0.654)    
-0.347 
(-0.742) 
Equity Holdings   0.158 (0.934)   
0.128 
(0.620) 
Largest Shareholder    -0.016 (-0.193)  
-0.033 
(-0.379) 
Type of  Market     -0.041 (-1.804) 
-0.017 
(-0.645) 
Adjusted 2R  0.067 -0.006 -0.001 -0.010 0.022 0.038 
N 101 
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Figure 1. CARs from Day -5 through Day +10 
 
This figure presents graphical illustration of the cumulative abnormal returns from 
Day -5 through Day +10 
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